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DUE CARE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR PROTECTION UNDER THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,1 the Delaware Supreme Court held the direc-
tors of Trans Union Company ("Trans Union") personally liable for
gross negligence in approving the sale of Trans Union.
The chairman and chief executive officer of Trans Union, Van
Gorkom, called a meeting of the board of directors at which he an-
nounced for the first time that he had procured a potential buyer of the
company.2 After meeting for only two hours, the directors approved the
sale of Trans Union by means of a cash-out merger, with "New T Com-
pany" as the surviving corporation.3 The directors relied solely on Van
Gorkom's representation of the details and desirability of the proposed
transaction in reaching their decision.' The Merger Agreement provided
for a fixed price of fifty-five dollars per share.' The directors made no
attempt to verify the adequacy of the merger price. 6 After a four-month
"market test" period during which Trans Union was allowed to entertain
other offers, Trans Union shareholders approved the proposed merger.7
Although the merger price represented a substantial premium, a group
of Trans Union shareholders brought suit against the board of directors
to recover damages based on the alleged inadequacy of the merger price. 8
The Delaware supreme court reversed the lower court's judgment for the
defendants and held: Before recommending a merger, the board of direc-
1. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
2. Id. at 866-67.
3. Id. at 869. New T Company was a subsidiary of the defendant Marmom Group, Inc.,
owned by Jay Pritzker and Robert Pritzker. Id. at 863-64.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b), (c) (1974) requires the directors to adopt a resolution approving
a merger agreement before submitting that agreement to the stockholders for a vote.
4. 488 A.2d at 868-69, 874. An outside lawyer retained by Van Gorkom advised the directors
that a fairness opinion was not required by law and that they might be sued for not accepting the
offer. Id. at 868-69.
5. The $55-a-share price represented a substantial premium. The highest price on the New
York Stock Exchange for Trans Union stock during the year that the merger was approved was $38
'/4 per share. Id. at 866 n.5.
6. Id. at 874-77. Moreover, no member of the board read the Merger Agreement, id. at 869,
or inquired into Van Gorkom's role in forcing the sale, id. at 874, 877.
7. Id. at 870.
8. Id. at 863. The plaintiffs also asked for the rescission of the merger, an unlikely remedy
when monetary damages are available. Id.
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tors must obtain all reasonably available information to satisfy their duty
of due care and to obtain protection from subsequent liability under the
business judgment rule.9
The business judgment rule protects corporate directors from liability
for their honest but informed mistakes of judgment by preventing courts
from examining the merits of a business decision. 10 The application of
the business judgment rule creates a rebuttable presumption that the di-
rectors' decision was proper." Before a director may obtain protection
under the business judgment rule, however, the director must first
demonstrate that he exercised due care and good faith in the decision-
making process. 2 The Delaware courts have inconsistently applied the
due care requirement, strictly applying the requirement in some circum-
stances 3 while apparently ignoring it in others.' 4
9. Id. at 864, 893. The court remanded the case to the Chancery Court to determine the fair
value of the shares based on Trans Union's "intrinsic value" at the time the board of directors
approved the merger, and to award damages to the extent the value exceeded $55 per share. Id at
893.
10. 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (1975).
11. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Block & Prussin, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 33 (1981).
12. Commentators have formulated the standards for the business judgment rule differently.
One commentator points out that the due care requirement does not conflict with the business judg-
ment rule; judicial noninterference in matters of business judgment is predicated on the assumption
that "judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised." 3A W. FLETCHER,
CLYCOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (1975).
Delaware courts have at times explicitly recognized the need for due care before invoking the
business judgment rule. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (appli-
cation of business judgment rule depends on showing that informed directors exercised business
judgment). At other times, the courts' recognition of a duty of care has been merely implicit. See,
e.g., Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del. Ch. 1980) (business judgment rule presumes
a "rational business decision").
For an explanation of the significance of the due care element in judicial review, see generally
Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbour But Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus.
LAW. 947, 961 (1980) (rule mandates inquiry to extent necessary for court to ascertain whether
decision was product of reasoned judgment).
13. See, eg., Lutz v. Boas, 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (1961) (director of mutual fund held
liable for failing to discover illegal transactions).
14. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
One commentator has observed: "In reality the application of the business judgment rule has
excised the requirement that directors exercise ordinary care in the exercise of their offices." Com-
ment, Director Liability Under the Business Judgment Rule: Fact or Fiction?, 35 Sw. L.J. 775, 792
(1981). Similarly, in Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591, 591 (1983), the author
suggests a number of reasons for the courts' failure to impose sanctions on directors for lack of due
care. First, courts are reluctant to damage reputations or to impose financial hardship on defendants
who have not acted in bad faith, but simply have failed to meet "ambiguous standards of care." Id.
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The application of the duty of care has in the past depended largely on
the context of the particular business decision. For example, in Bennett
v. Propp,t5 a chief executive officer undertook an unauthorized stock re-
purchase as a defensive tactic to a takeover bid.16 The board of directors
ratified the CEO's actions. ' 7 The court recognized that the time pressure
caused by the hostile takeover attempt and the gravity of the situation
made the directors' ratification appropriate under the circumstances. 18 In
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 9 however, the Del-
aware Supreme Court examined the duty of care less exactingly. In Gra-
ham, a shareholder claimed that indictments based on the alleged price-
fixing activities of company employees were the result of the directors'
failure to consider the company's consent decrees to past price-fixing vio-
lations, and to take steps to prevent further violations.2 ° The court found
that the directors had "satisfied themselves" that the past violations had
not actually taken place, and therefore the directors did not have notice
of future illegal price fixing.2 The court held that the directors were
entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their employees until they
had reason to suspect wrongdoing.22
In Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc.,23 the Delaware Chancery Court
appeared to diminish further the duty of care. In Gimbel, a shareholder
at 598. Second, courts may recognize the limitations inherent in the director's role, such as the need
to rely on corporate officers and consultants for advice and information. Id at 612.
15. 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962).
16. Id. at 24, 187 A.2d at 410.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 22-24, 187 A.2d at 409-10.
19. 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963).
20. Id. at 80, 188 A.2d at 127. Note that the circumstances in Graham do not actually present
an instance of an affirmative "'business judgment." See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 n.7
(Del. 1984).
21. 41 Del. Ch. at 84, 188 A.2d at 129. The court listed some circumstances under which the
court would find directors liable:
If... [the director] has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy em-
ployee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has ignored
either wilfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrongdoing, the
law will cast the burden of liability upon him.
Id.
22. Id. Similarly, in Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 1973), the court
presumed that Western Union's board of directors exercised due care in reaching its decision to
merge with another corporation. A Western Union shareholder sought to enjoin the merger, claim-
ing that the directors lacked material information about the acquired corporation when they agreed
to purchase that company at an allegedly excessive price. Id. at 906. The court merely concluded
that the directors deserved the presumption of having made an informed judgment. Id. at 909.
23. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974).
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sued to enjoin the consummation of the sale of a subsidiary, ciliming that
personal interests motivated the directors' decision to sell. 24 The court
relied on the substantive merits of the board's decision and did not in-
quire into the directors' exercise of care. The court concluded that the
board's decision was protected by the business judgment rule.2 5  "[T]he
ultimate question," according to the court, "was not one of method, but
of value."
26
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,z7 the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the
relationship between the due care requirement and the business judgment
rule. The court found that insufficient care in the Trans Union board's
decisionmaking process precluded the application of the business judg-
ment rule.
The court made several critical findings in reaching its decision. The
board acted hastily under no constraints of an emergency.28 The board
failed to obtain opinions from investment bankers, relying instead on the
chief executive officer's twenty-minute oral presentation. 29  Finally, the
24. Id. at 604.
25. Id. at 615. Nevertheless, the court noted that the directors' decision was made in haste
without all available information and that the directors failed to seek a higher price. Id. at 612. The
court found these factors were probably insufficient to overcome the business judgment "standard."
Id. at 615. They did not justify the conclusion that the directors acted unadvisedly. Id..
26. Id. The court did grant the injunction, however, because the plaintiff alleged a gross dispar-
ity between the sale price of the company and its fair market value. Id.
27. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
28. Id. at 874. The directors had no prior notice of the purpose of the September 20 meeting
called to approve the Merger Agreement, but approved the sale after only two hours.
29. Id. Pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)(1974), directors are "fully protected in
relying in good faith upon... reports made to the corporation by any of its officers." Although the
court noted that the term "report" had been liberally construed in Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494,
507-08, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964) (term included reports of informal personal investigations by cor-
porate officers), the court considered that Van Gorkom's twenty-minute presentation was not a re-
port under § 141(e), because Van Gorkom was unfamiliar with the Merger Agreement of which he
spoke. 488 A.2d at 875. Furthermore, even if Van Gorkom had been familiar with the Merger
Agreement,'in light of all the surrounding circumstances-the lack of notice, the lack of time con-
straints, and the absence of supporting documentation-the directors were "duty bound to make
reasonable inquiry" about the adequacy of the proposed merger price. Id.
The court said explicitly that the board did not need to take any particular measure to ascertain
the company's value, such as a fairness opinion or an outside valuation study, but the directors did
need to obtain all reasonably available information. If they had done so, they would have learned
that the proposed merger price was calculated for buy-out feasibility rather than for valuation, and
would have inquired further about its fairness.
Moreover, the original Merger Agreement did not give Trans Union the right to distribute propri-
etary information to prospective suitors or to solicit competing offers. Id. at 878. As finally exe-
cuted, the Agreement read in pertinent part:
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shareholder ratification was ineffective because the proxy materials failed
to disclose the method used by the board to determine the merger price.30
In Van Gorkom, the court reaffirmed the importance of due care as a
prerequisite for the protection of the business judgment rule. In the spe-
cific context of a merger, the court will defer to the business judgment of
a board after assurances that the decision was "informed and deliberate"
and that the directors possessed "all reasonably available information." 31
The Van Gorkom standard is consistent with the rationale for the busi-
ness judgment rule. In protecting shareholder interests, the court should
not interfere with the judgments of corporate officers.32 Instead, the
court should determine director liability by reference to the process by
which the board acted and not by the merits of the decision made.33
The court specifically derived the "informed and deliberate" require-
ment from the language of the Delaware merger statute.34 Whether the
The Board of Directors shall recommend to the stockholders of Trans Union that they
approve and adopt the Merger Agreement ('the stockholders' approval') and to use its best
efforts to obtain the requisite vote therefor. GL acknowledges that Trans Union directors
may have a competing fiduciary obligation to the stockholders under certain
circumstances.
Id. at 879. The defendants relied on this passage to demonstrate both the right to distribute proprie-
tary information and to accept a better offer. The court found that, "on its face," this language
incorporated neither condition. Id.
Furthermore, the court found the market test period, by which the parties would test the validity
of the stock price, inadequate. The first press release announcing the sale of Trans Union described
the Merger Agreement as "definitive." Id.
30. The proxy materials were "false and misleading" because they stated that the chief financial
officer's preliminary report indicated the value of the company was "in the range of $55.00 to $65.00
per share." Id. at 891. As the court repeatedly emphasized, that figure was made to determine the
feasibility of a leveraged buy-out, and not to ascertain the value of the stock. Id.
A dissenting opinion emphasized the directors' longstanding familiarity with the affairs of Trans
Union and their ability to make a reasonable decision under the circumstances. Id. at 894
(McNeilly, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, failed to address the directors' failure to obtain
information on Trans Union's inherent valuation.
31. Id. at 873.
32. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
33. The court must also consider the circumstances in which the decision was made. See supra
notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing Bennett).
34. 488 A.2d at 873. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1974) provides in pertinent part:
The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall
adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation. . . . Any of the
terms of the agreement of merger or consolidation may be made dependent upon facts ascer-
tainable outside of such agreement, provided that the manner in which such facts shall oper-
ate upon the terms of the agreement is clearly and expressly set forth in the agreement of
merger or consolidation.
488 A.2d at 873 n.14 (court's emphasis). The court relied on § 251(b) to find that directors have a
duty to act in an informed and deliberate manner in approving a merger for submission to stockhold-
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requirement will extend to other major business decisions is unclear. For
example, in the context of a hostile takeover attempt, the Delaware
courts will likely apply a less stringent due care requirement to account
for the time pressure placed on directors defending takeover bids.
A probable result of the Van Gorkom decision will be to encourage the
formalization of the decisionmaking process.35 Directors should adopt
some combination of procedures indicative of deliberate decisionmaking,
such as adequate and timely notice to directors of the purpose of meet-
ings and documentation supporting the business reason for the deci-
sion.36 The Van Gorkom standard that directors must obtain all
reasonably available information may also compel directors to retain, at
a considerable cost, investment bankers to assist them with important
business decisions accompanying fundamental changes in corporate
control.
K.A.W.
ers. The language emphasized by the court, however, merely indicates that the terms of a merger
agreement may be conditioned on the performance or occurrence of outside contingencies or facts.
The board's mandate to adopt a resolution containing the terms of the merger implies, perhaps, a
duty to know what is in the agreement.
35. One commentator has suggested that matters involving corporate structure or personnel in
particular require deliberative decision-making. These matters would include mergers, stock issu-
ances, selection of key officers, and sales of considerable assets. See Cohn, supra note 14, at 616.
36. The court stated that boards must provide "some credible contemporary evidence demon-
strating that the directors knew what they were doing." 488 A.2d at 883 n.25.
[Vol. 64:655
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/16
